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Since the fall of the Berlin wall, in a world in which labour seemed to have lost its 
universality as historical subject, and the rise of anti-racist and feminist movements led 
to identity politics, many post-marxists have been using Carl Schmitt’s 
conceptualization of the Political – combined with notions of Gramsci – to revise 
critical theory and criticize neoliberal hegemony. In this paper I will argue that Marx’s 
perspective on crisis/exception is more “political” that Schmitts. Throughout its 
conceptual history - from Greek mythology and philosophy, to its modern scientific 
meanings – the concepts of crisis relied upon an apparent opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity. I explore how, from Socrates to Marx, these dialectic 
relations have dominated European political philosophy.The concept of crisis explores 
the boundaries between judgement and process, between ideology and material 
circumstances and thus reveals the boundaries between “science” and the two other 
epistemological fields which are often opposed to science: history – with an analysis of 
the metodenstreit and Popper – and the Political – with a focus on the work of Carl 
Schmitt and the state of exception. Based on these I make the case that crisis opens 
the way for a truly political and historical scientific knowledge. Such a “Political” 
scientific perspective – rather than the natural or social scientific framework – I 
consider essential for critical theory about science in times of liberal hegemony. On 
these basis I will argue for a return towards Marxism - as the political science par 
excellence – in order to adress the shortcommings of critical theory today. 
 The context of the Political 
The major inspiration for the conceptualization of the concept of the political in contemporary 
critical theory, ranging from Mouffe, Laclau, Swyngedouw, Brown, Zizek, Agamben, and 
Derrida to Arendt, was Carl Schmitt. Schmitt dedicated his work to the relation between 
science and the political. As a student of Max Weber, Schmitt developed the concept of the 
Political as an answer to the crisis of the Weimar republic. According to Schmitt, the 
neo-Kantian methodologies used by Weber and his contemporary liberal colleagues were 
inadequate to cope with the changing conditions. (McCormick p79) He accused their approach 
to be “soulless”; reflecting only the dominant thought of depolitical modernist technicism, 
which reduced humans to mere machines and took away any real meaning in the world and in 
life.  
Schmitt wasn’t satisfied either with his contemporary resistance to this industrial alienation, 
which according to him took the form of romanticism (RC, PR). Romanticism’s simple negation 
of modern technical rationality – in the form of aesthetics - neglects the struggle of ideologies 
– and thus couldn’t therefore transcend the dualism of soul and soullessness, characteristic of 
the modern age. (McCormick Schmitt) Schmitt resorts to a Hegelian dialectic approach to 
escape this dilemma. He writes that in contrast to “purely natural-scientific rationalism”, which 
“could never grasp what is politically at issue, namely, the concrete situation and the concrete 
moment”, Hegel’s “dialectical philosophy of history, if properly employed, provides a powerful 
means to free the concrete here and now, the hic et nunc, from the sphere of irrational 
intuitions or emotionally guided impressionism, and install man as the master over the 
irrationality of a fate ordained by God, nature, or providence” (Schmitt, Hegel and Marx) The 
Political functions as the aufhebung between modernity and its dialectical negation, 
romanticism, between technology and aesthetics, between science and myth. 
According to Schmitt, meaning is restored by the political, defined by the “distinction of friend 
and enemy’ - its main criterion. The political contrast based upon ‘decision’  or judgement, - of 
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“we” in contrast with a “them”, locates meaning in the realm of collective identifications. 
(Mouffe, Furner 2014) These shared collective identities are not aimed at escaping reality but 
to change it. 
1 - the expression of will whose binding force is ‘created out of nothing’, not following a norm or 
precedent.” 
Schmitt’s concept of the political has religious roots. Against the protestant ethic of Capitalism 
in Weber’s work, Schmitt – as a devout catholic - chose the political in Roman Catholicism – a 
political institution with religious fervor, giving meaning to man and society, prepared for 
making alliances and to declare enemies. (McCormick p73) As Schmitt distanced himself from 
the church, he conceived a Political theology based on nationalism and myth; eventually 
transforming him eventually from a conservative catholic into a reactionary supporter of 
fascism. The reactionary content given by Schmitt to the political is undeniable, and shows its 
dangers. Nevertheless has the conception of the political as an anti-thesis to the liberal 
domestication of policies trough rational argument and privatization, rendered it inspirational 
for much of our contemporary critical thinking, particularly in times of crisis of neoliberal 
hegemony.  
Crisis, the exception and the political 
 
As we have seen before, Schmitt developed the concept of the political in the middle of the 
crisis of the nineteen thirties. The link between crisis, the political and hegemony is not a mere 
historical coincidence. In this decade, the contradictions of the European capitalist system 
became undeniable, and the liberal consensus became unsustainable. Schmitt’s concept of the 
Political emerged at the moment when the laws of the free market exchange and cosmopolitan 
international law vanished in the polarization between identities of classes, nations and races. 
The Political served as a critique of the declining liberal hegemony – that was Schmitt’s aim in 
his critique of liberal technique -, but was at the same time the expression of its historical 
demise – at least temporarily – and its disruption in conflicting ideologies.  
Schmitt uses the concept of exception in a very similar way as the idea of “crisis”; as a moment 
of disruption of the normal, a need for political, even theological judgement. This state of 
exception stands in contrast to liberal, positivist science tries to intrinsically tries “banish from 
the human mind every exception”. (MC223, PT 41)  
Schmitt claims that this relation between norm – the normal state, consensus - and exception 
cannot be understood without dialectics: the exception confirms the existence of the norm and 
the norm creates the exception. (127 MC) According to Schmitt, the state of exception - 
particularly in his work starting from Political Theology in 1922 – brings with it the possibility 
of sovereign powers; that is: the power of law-making authority beyond the law/norm, that can 
creates a new historical political situation that irreversible transforms its nature. Inspired by 
Schmitt, according to Agamben the state of exception “​marks a threshold at which logic and 
praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without ​logos​ claims to realize an enunciation 
without any real reference.”  
Crisis thus emerges, when consensus is over, when the choice appears, when the Political 
emerges. This Political transgresses politics – the low policy dimension, le Politique versus la 
politique (Mouffe) – and thus enters in the very scientific paradigms as well. A crisis exists 
when Hegemony is challenged, thus when the scientific consensus disappears: rather than a 
transition from natural toward social sciences, in a crisis, we observe a necessary transition 
towards a Politization of sciences. 
This politicization is not necessarily a fatal barrier to scientific knowledge. On the contrary: 
Schmitt had defended that in the state of Exception, it is the differentiation between enemy and 
friend itself that produces meaning. (McCormick, 92) If one accepts the premise that “truth” is 
always partial; “obscuration” – defending the friend-perspective and disconsidering the 
legitimacy of the enemy one - should be approached as an enabling blind spot for the production 
of knowledge. (Roitman, 2011) The political functions as a filter and structuring principle in the 
natural chaos of information. It is within this context that Roitman (2011) claims that “crisis” 
should be treated as an “enabling paradox”. (Roitman 2011) When in a “critique” – or a Political 
scientific perspective - crisis is depicted as the logical outcome of historical progress – it de 
facto obscures the contingent political significance of such critique; but doing so Crisis 
functions as a lens which makes certain things visible and others not – producing a particular 
forms of knowledge. Crisis thus effectively creates and structures a new Political science. 
The Political is not enough 
Can we then neglect the problems with Schmitt’s concept of the political? Above I referred to 
the reactionary content Schmitt gave to the political. While the crisis of liberalism was also a 
precondition for social experiments of the popular fronts, the social welfare state and 
redistribution policies, one cannot neglect that the way how fascism – the so-called ultra-politics 
(Zizek) – could bring the crisis towards other-than-progressive Political conclusions.  
As McCormick (p112) rightly points out: The concept of “political activity” in Schmitt’s work, 
tends to fall into the trap he so much reproached the political romanticists. That is to say: just as 
the esthetics of romanticism, his approach is characterized by the final emptiness of the concept 
of the Political as such – as “the political is itself devoid of any substantive content”.  
The consequence of this “emptiness” is that its conceptual approach can be useful for 
approaches from all kind of different political perspectives – and can therefore create monsters 
as well. Isn’t this described in Gramsci’s - Schmitt’s contemporary - famous description: “Crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old world is dying and the new cannot yet be born, in this 
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” (A Gramsci, 1971, p556) 
While the Schmittean interpretation of the political was ultra-reactionary - in the form of a 
catholic opposition to liberalism – and Schmitt’s legal interpretation of crisis, the state of 
exception, legitimized a fascist regime, it also enabled Schmitt’s theory to become particularly 
relevant for thinking the Political among contemporary progressive theorists, as referred before. 
Many contemporary critical “post-Marxist” theorists used Schmitt to transcend Marx and 
Gramsci in a post-modern age. The political seemed to be a crucial concept of critique in an age 
in which socialism was seen as “passé” and where the category of labour seemed to have 
become too weak, too accommodated and too conservative to play the role of a universal 
historical agent; as the driving force of emancipatory change. Chantal Mouffe’s and Ernesto 
Laclau’s “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy”, and Mouffe’s further work are a prime example. 
Schmitt’s idea of the political would enable them to transcend the universality of capital, and 
instead focus to build alliances between different identities in changing common struggles in a 
pluralist democratization. The political thus legitimized the dawn of the era of identity politics 
in political and critical theory and practice. 
But as much as Schmitt accused the romanticists of becoming accommodated within liberalism 
as a mere form of aesthetics, a similar critique could been directed to many forms of 
contemporary “critical” identity politics which are based on the concept of the political. Let us 
instead do the opposite of what Mouffe, Habermas – whose project was the removal of the 
“ideological ballast” out of Historical Materialism​ - ​and others have done: Let us bring 
Schmitt’s concept of the political back into Marx’s analysis. Given the ideological enmity of the 
conservative catholic Carl Schmitt towards Bolshevism, an honest “Schmittean reading of 
Marx” could sound ridiculous, but I believe it could give some of the answers to the theoretical 
and ideological shortcomings of Schmitt’s theory; and bring some insight for a 
reconceptualization of “Political” Science. 
Marxism as a more than Political Science 
Curiously, in a radio-broadcast of 1931, Carl Schmitt himself proposed Marxism as the ultimate 
form of a political science. He considered Marx’s theory particularly important in a context in 
which “the political” was “situated in a seemingly apolitical, economically determined 
industrial society.” (Schmitt, 2014 p 389). The political – in the form of the radical opposition 
between Capital and Labour – is the kernel of ‘Marxist... science’ “(Furner, 2014 p374) 
But Marx is more than just political (Furner). The most fundamental difference between Marx 
and Schmitt lies in the points of departure for the analysis of modernity. Schmitt, influenced by 
Weber, considered technicity the driving force behind modernity. This focus on “technicity” – 
the general phenomena of economic-technical thought or Weberian rationalization - which 
incorporates both the dynamics of market and bureaucracy (McCormick p45)- allowed Schmitt 
to claim that Marx, and the communists, ultimately shared the same cultural principles, of 
technical development, as the bourgeois society. Such a culturalist characterization of 
technicity conceived “the political” as the mythical anti-thesis of “scientific”. In Schmittean 
terms, a real “Political science” would therefore be impossible, and Political knowledge is 
condemned to mythical meanings. Not so for Marx.  
A return to Marx – with a re-adaption Schmitts conception of the political – would in my 
perspective be a more fruitful approach. Instead of technicity, Marx projected the relations of 
production – capital, with its processes of accumulation, commodification and resistance 
against it - as the driving force behind modernity and the processes of alienation . In fact, Marx 
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took here a much more consequent “Schmittean” position than Schmitt; in the sense that his 
differentiation between Capital and Labour, the enemy and friend according to his perspective, 
brought “the political” to root itself of the historical process behind modernity. Not only does 
this make the analysis of modernity more consistent; it also permits to differentiate between 
“science” as a method and form of knowledge – and the effective driving force of alienation; 
that is Capital.  
Without question, also for Marx, every truth is “political”; “The question whether objective 
truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical 
question. ​Man must prove the truth​ — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his 
thinking in practice.” (Marx in thesis on Feuerbach) As in Carl Schmitt’s “political activity”, 
Marx truth is a political and historical practice . But in Marx, the focus on labour, capital and 
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the relations of production also give a “substance” to the political, more than “myth” can ever 
provide. Praxis brings material resources and historical agents “within” the process of a 
dialectical analysis. 
Even Schmitt aknowledges this in his analysis of Marx and Hegel, when he says that Socialism is 
“not simply any possible type of criticism of the ills common to all epochs. It is not compassion 
for the unfortunate and the poor, struggle against injustice, resistance and rebellion.” Schmitt 
2 This is the project of Political Marxism and Ellen Wood’s repoliticization of Historical Materialism in 
Democracy against capitalism 
3 Praxis 
admits the merits of this Marxist ‘Scientific’ dimension, meaning that the Political is planted in 
“a concrete rational consciousness of one’s historical situation as a whole, and, following from 
this, the claim to shape the entire situation of humanity in accordance with this 
consciousness.”(Schmitt p390) The communist doctrine towards crisis completely changes the 
relation between the normal and the exception, and so, according to Schmitt: “The concepts of 
truth and science in Marxist scientific socialism can only be understood from such a dialectical 
philosophy of history.”  
This doesn’t foreclose the element of “political myth”. Myth plays an important role in the 
scientific Political struggle; particularly in the conception of class opposition and class 
conscience; in the popular transformation from “klasse an sich” to “klasse fur sich”, and in the 
universalization of its claims as historical agent – from a particular material interest towards a 
universal truth. This political process and the struggle for truth that later would characterize 
Gramsci’s conception of Hegemony, is already present in Marx. 
The subaltern class perspective by definition represents a particular point of view and defines 
the field of visibility; and thus rejects an “objective-scientific” perspective, the hegemonic 
bourgeois “normality” that hides its “real interests”.(Lowy 1978). The alternative perspective is 
political, subjective and literary “hypocrite” – as an ascending step of critique/crisis.  For Marx, 
who theorizes from the proletarian position – that is to say starting from the material interests 
of the category of Labour - economic crisis functions as a moment when this “real” is made 
bare: The truth of the contradictions of the capitalist form of production – deriving from the 
fundamental opposition between Capital and Labour – emerges through the crisis. 
By “politicizing economics”, by choosing  sides, through the focus on labour – as a subjective 
human negative element – at the core of capitalist reproduction in the form of value-formation 
and commodification (Löwy 1978, 72–73), Marx introduced class-struggle into the very heart 
of economic critique of capitalist reproduction.  By doing so, Marx was able to historicize 
capitalism; in other words, instead of presenting the capitalist market-mechanisms as positive 
natural laws to be discovered; his approach revealed it to be a contingent social formation 
whose present and future depended upon a political conflict. By placing it in relation to other 
modes of production, he opened a possibility for change. The concept of crisis, also in Marx, 
plays a crucial element here, particularly in the form of revelation of the true political conflict. 
In Marx’s own words: “In the crises of the world market, the contradictions and antagonisms of 
bourgeois production are strikingly revealed”. 
Crisis, Critique and Political Science now 
The concept of crisis is full of contradictions. These originate in the old meaning of the Greek 
concept of crisis, or krinein – which involves both an objective and subjective dimension, a 
moment of choice. Instead of seeing the contradiction as an ambiguity, a confusing element, 
and thus a limit to its scientific usefulness, this presentation explored the clarifying potentiality 
in the contradiction itself.  
Crisis marks the temporal coincidence of the political need of universal truths, as well as the 
knowledge of their own historical particularity, and with it the possibility of political change. 
Crisis breaks hegemony in the sense that it reveals that the post- or pre-political consensus is 
no longer possible, and political conflict appears. In a crisis-context, we see the true 
antagonistic political emerge – contradictions become at least temporarily irreconcilable. 
The potentiality of crisis to reintroduce the political and the historical in scientific knowledge is 
even more important in our contemporary context of – declining – neoliberal hegemony which 
portrays our reality as being post-historical and post-political. Crisis requires the question of 
choosing sides in science. 
 
